We use an extensive scanner data set to cast fresh light on consumer payment choice, with a focus on the role played by transaction value. The panel structure of our data set allows us to directly control for heterogeneous payment preferences between households, as well as to correct for endogeneity of transaction value. Our estimation procedure utilizes a novel expectation-maximization computation algorithm to estimate a multinomial probit model with tens of thousands of fixed effects and a jackknife algorithm to correct for potential bias due to the incidental parameter problem. We find evidence of substantial unobserved payment preferences across households, and demonstrate in a counterfactual they are key in explaining substitution patterns between payment choices. In addition, we use a control function approach to correct for endogeneity, which we find substantially reduces the importance of transaction value in driving payment choice.
Introduction
Over the past several decades, payments in the U.S. have shifted from paper payment instruments, namely cash and check, towards digital instruments, such as payment cards. This shift is important because from a policy perspective digital payments are typically regarded as superior in most ways: they are faster and cheaper to process, and they are easier to track and less conducive to fraud. However, while many consumers have embraced digital payments, cash and check still play a large role in the overall economy. Understanding this persistence has been a key question in the payments industry.
Much public policy hinges on how consumers make payment choices. For example, predicting the social impact of payment card market regulation requires knowledge of how consumers substitute between payment instruments. And understanding the future cost and efficiency of payment systems depends on the relative use of paper versus digital payments. Looking further ahead, the Federal Reserve System has issued a white paper calling for a faster payments system, and policymakers are closely watching new payment technologies such as mobile payments and virtual payments.
The focus of this paper is on understanding the importance of the various factors driving payment choice, and its implications for competition between existing and potential future payment instruments. First, we take advantage of the panel structure of our data set and look for evidence of single-homing, and its evolution over time. 1 Single-homing plays an important role in theoretical models of two-sided markets (see Armstrong, 2006; Rochet & Tirole, 2006) , and may limit innovation in the payments market if adopting a new payment technology requires a consumers to stop using existing payment instruments. We then construct a model whose aim is to measure the impact on payment choice of observed household demographic characteristics, unobserved household preferences, and shopping trip characteristics. Here, we pose a research question that has not been studied in depth before: how much do payment preferences vary between consumers, and does accounting for such heterogeneity affect coefficients estimates for the main drivers of payment choice? The focus is particularly on transaction value, which is viewed in the literature as a key driver of payment choice. Finally, we perform a counterfactual experiment to investigate the extent to which heterogeneous household preferences affect substitution patterns between payment instruments to shed light on the persistence of paper payment instruments and draw implications for innovation in the payments industry.
An important contribution of this paper is to introduce a new data source for studying payment choice: scanner data. We use the Nielsen Homescan database, a household survey of grocery shopping behavior typically used in marketing contexts. The resulting panel data set captures grocery shopping trips for over 13,500 households over the course of three years. To our knowledge, no previous academic study has used such data to study payment choice. While our analysis is limited to food purchases for the home, grocery purchases are an important touchstone for payment choice, and is one of the few areas where we can track individual household behavior over long periods of time.
Our data set allows us to ask questions that previous research could not. For example, a closely related paper is Klee (2008) , which also studied the role of transaction value in determining payment choice using scanner data from grocery stores. However, Klee's data is captured at the store level, and thus does not contain directly-observed demographic char-acteristics, nor does it allow for controlling for unobserved household payment preferences. Other studies on payment choice, such as those conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston and Bank of Canada, rely on diary studies with only a few days of transactions. Because we have panel data for many shopping trips, we can control for household heterogeneity using household fixed effects, and identify the effect of demographic characteristics on payment choice based on within-household variation.
Results of our empirical analysis suggests that unobserved heterogeneity in household preferences plays a crucial role in driving payment choice -explicitly accounting for it increases our model's fit almost threefold, as measure by pseudo-R 2 . In addition, we find that the importance of transaction value as a driver of payment choice decreases significantly once we use instrumental variable correction for endogeneity in our model. This suggests that payment choices associated with higher transaction values, such as check and card, lead to more spending per shopping trip through phenomena such as "ticket lift", and that failing to account for such endogeneity can lead to positive bias in the importance of transaction value. The importance of our two main findings is highlighted in the counterfactual analysis, which looks at what would happen if checks were no longer available. The result suggests that, rather than switch to using card, the other instrument commonly used for high-value payments, the vast majority of consumers would instead switch to their preferred payment instrument. This finding confirms that unobserved household preferences play a much larger role than transaction value in determining payment choice.
Our paper makes contributions to the literature on empirical analysis of discrete choice in many ways. We employ an expectation-maximization (EM) estimator, which makes it computationally feasible to estimating a discrete choice model with tens of thousands of fixed effects. To address the incidental parameter problem that arises in nonlinear models with fixed effects, we employ a bias-correcting jackknife estimation procedure described by Dhaene & Jochmans (2015) . Finally, in order to correct for endogeneity we follow the control function approach, as outlined in Petrin & Train (2010) .
In addition, our paper makes multiple contributions to the literature on payment choice. As in Rysman (2007) , we find evidence of moderate single-homing: although relatively few households use a single payment instrument exclusively, most focus a substantial share of their payments on a single instrument. Findings from our main empirical model ascribe this mainly to unobserved payment preferences across households, rather than transaction value, the imporatance of which was exmphasized by previous work such as Klee (2008) , Ching & Hayashi (2010) , Arango, Huynh & Sabetti (2015) and Wang & Wolman (2014) . Our results suggest that new payment instruments may find it easier to enter the market if they focus on converting a smaller group of consumers to use their product intensively, rather than targeting everyone but focusing on a narrow application, such as low-value payments.
Overview and Data Description
This section provides a quick overview of the US payment system, the source and structure of the data set, and summary statistics for the variables. In addition, simple analysis is carried out to investigate the extent and persistence of single-homing, and to motivate the need for controlling for heterogeneity in household payment.
The US Payment System
Retail consumers in the U.S. generally have a choice of three main payment instruments: cash, check, and payment card. While innovations have been introduced in recent years, these have so far been limited to specific retailers (for example, a point-of-sale payment instrument based on credit transfer) and to the online stores (for example, narrow banks such as PayPal or crypto currencies such as Bitcoin), and thus have not had much of an impact on the day-to-day payment experience at brick-and-mortar stores. The Survey of Consumer Payment Choice carried out by the Boston Fed (CITE) estimates that in 2015 cash constituted 27% of consumer payments, by number, while checks and card constituted a further 7% and 55%, respectively. 2 Furthermore, while the exact number and value of cash transactions cannot be estimated for the U.S. economy as a whole, the 2015 Federal Reserve Payment Study (CITE) found that over the past decade and a half there has been a gradual shift away from check payments and toward card payments, with the total number of card payments overtaking check as the most popular non-cash payment instrument in 2006.
Data Sources
We draw our data from the Home-Scan database compiled by the A.C. Nielsen Company. Participating households report all purchases of food meant for home consumption. They receive a UPC scanner that they use to scan their grocery purchases, as well as a device to record their payment choice and manually enter purchases of products without UPC codes, such as fruit. Nielsen also collects receipts to verify households' purchase behavior.
This scanner data set has important advantages over alternative data sources used to study payment choice. Most importantly, we observe individual household decisions continuously for an extended period of time, which allows us to capture heterogeneity in tastes between households using fixed effects. This approach gives us an advantage over studies based on diaries of payment behavior, which usually gather only around one week of data (Rysman, 2007; Arango et al., 2015; Wakamori & Welte, 2012) , as well as studies that use cross-sectional data and need to rely on observable household characteristics to capture heterogeneity in tastes between households (Klee, 2008; Schuh, Stavins & Shy, 2010; Koulayev, Rysman, Schuh & Stavins, 2012) . 3 In addition, unlike most other studies, we directly observe important demographic characteristics such as household size and income, which gives us an advantage over studies that need to rely on demographic data collected at the census track level, which often masks significant variation in the data. Thanks to the significant length of the data panel means we observe sufficient within-household variation in demographic characteristics over time for their impact to be identified even in the presence of household fixed effects.
There are two potential limitations of our data that we need to acknowledge. First, we observe only grocery purchases, which make up only a small subset of any household's budget. However, groceries are an important touchpoint for payment choice, and the frequency with which households buy groceries results in substantial number of recorded transactions for each household. Second, our data is limited to shopping trips that include calorie-rich consumer packaged foods. 4 While this limits our data, we have no reason to believe it biases our results once we control for household heterogeneity.
The main variable of interest in the data is the payment instrument used, which distinguishes between cash, checks and payment cards. 5 For each shopping trip we observe the transaction value, which includes any items that the consumer buys at the register, including non-food items, and does not include any cash back that the consumer may withdraw from their bank account if purchasing with a debit card. In addition, we observe the date of the shopping trip, a household identifier, gender of the shopper, indicators for whether the shopper used a loyalty card or coupons, the type of store (grocery market, convenience store or non-food store, such as Target), as well as a store identifier. The panel also records consumer demographics, updated once a year, such as the income, age and education level of male and female adults, household size, race, pet ownership, home-ownership status, and the designated marketing area (DMA) the house is located in.
Our data set covers the period 2006-2008 for 16 DMAs, which are geographical regions somewhat larger than the average Metropolitan Statistical Area and are meant to denote television markets. The final data set contains 1.34 million transactions performed by 13,574 households. While there is turnover in the panel, the majority of households remain in the data set for the entire three-year duration, and even the 90th percentile of duration 3 Another approach is to obtain data directly from consumer bank accounts, such as in White (1975) , Cho & Rust (2012) , Stango & Zinman (2012) and Dutkowsky & Fusaro (2011) . However, these studies typically provide no information on how the consumer uses cash, and consumers may use multiple accounts for transactions, some of which may not show up in the available transaction record.
4 We obtain this data set through the Zwick Center for Food and Resource Policy at the University of Connecticut. The center obtained it for purposes of studying the demand for calorie-rich consumer packaged foods and thus obtained all shopping trips that include at least one of the following seven product categories: ready-to-eat breakfast cereals, candy, gum, salty snacks, fruit, nuts, and carbonated soft drinks.
5 In fact, the survey asks households to record whether they use cash, check, a credit card or a debit card. Unfortunately, households were instructed to record as "credit" any card transaction that uses a signature, which would include signature-authenticated debit transactions. In light of this, we aggregate all card transactions. This approach allows us to study the use of digital payments relative to paper payments without the risk of introducing measurement bias into the analysis. In addition, Koulayev et al. (2012) find that household use of debit and credit cards for transactional purposes is similar.
household is in the data set for close to one year. Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of the number of shopping trips across households. While most households in the data set made a sufficient number of shopping trips for our analysis to include household fixed effects, it is clear that there are households with considerably fewer shopping trips. Consideration for this will drive the methodology we employ to capture the unobserved household preferences in our model. Table 1 reports basic market shares for each payment instrument, using population weights. While we find higher cash use than for the economy as a whole, this is not surprising for the grocery industry. As expected, cash accounts for a much lower proportion of transactions by value. Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of payment shares by number of transactions across households. The first take-away from the figure is that there is substantial variation in payment shares across households, with only check showing clustering around the sample mean, as captured in Table 1 . In addition, the bi-modal distributions for cash and check suggest that there is clustering away from the means, with a substantial number of house- holds displaying strong preference for card over the other two payment instruments, and a smaller but still substantial number of households displaying strong preference for cash. This observation suggests that households exhibit persistent preference for some payment instruments over others, and provides support for using household fixed effects in our model. 
Single-homing, heterogeneity between households and long-term trends
In order to gain a better understanding of the differences in payment preferences between households we study the extent to which households focus their spending on a single payment instrument. This approach follows that taken by Rysman (2007) , who studied single-homing on credit card networks. First, we determine each household's favorite payment instrument, which we define as the payment instrument with the highest combined transaction value across all transactions performed by the household. The analysis then focuses on how the percent of payment value on the favorite instrument varies across the population. For example, if a household puts 60% of value on card, and 20% on each cash and check, we would say that card is the favorite payment instrument and that the household puts 60% on its favorite payment instrument. If everyone had identical preferences over payment instruments, results from Table 1 imply that all households would pick card as their favorite payment instrument, but would exhibit multi-homing behavior with 57.1% of payment value on card, 32.7% on cash and 10.2% on check. In practice, we find that the degree of single-homing varies substantial across households. Figure 3 illustrates this clearly, with the household at the 90th percentile spending almost twice as much on its favorite payment instrument as the household at the 10th percentile. In addition, a large portion of the population exhibits clear single-homing behavior: 75% of households put more than 95% of their transactions on a single payment choice, and more than 10% use only one payment instrument. If we extend our analysis to the favorite two payment instruments, we find that the majority of households rarely use more than two payment instruments: 75% of households put more than 98% of their transactions on their favorite two payment instruments. In addition to providing a static overview of household payment choices, our panel data set allows us to analyze whether households change their payment preferences over time. Table 2 shows a transition matrix for the households' favorite payment instrument quarter by quarter. 6 The high values on the diagonal indicate that switching is relatively rare. For 6 Each row sums to 100 and each element in the row provides the probability of ending in that column, given the household started in that row. For instance, the first row indicates that for a household whose favorite payment instrument is cash in one quarter there is a 86.43% chance that cash will again be its favorite next period, and a 1.88% and 11.70% chance that its new favorite payment instrument next period will be check or card, respectively. instance, the probability that a household whose favorite payment instrument was card one period will again choose card next quarter is about 90%. This implies that, on average, such a household will keep card as the favorite payment instrument for 10 quarters, or 2.5 years. The corresponding average for cash is 7.2 quarters, while for check it is only 4.3 quarters. The implication of these findings is that we should expect household-specific preferences to play a major role in explaining payment choice. Not only do households differ substantially between one another in terms of which payment instruments they prefer, their preferences also seem to be relatively stable over time.
Explanatory variables
One of the best-documented facts in the payment literature is that payment choice varies substantially with transaction value. 7 Figure 4 illustrates this trend clearly in our data, with lower-value transactions being paid for mostly in cash, and rising transaction value leading to a higher proportion of transactions being paid with check and card.
Following the payment literature we examine a variety of other factors that may influence payment choice. Table 4 provides the summary statistics for these variables, grouped into demographic characteristics, which vary between households and, to a lesser extent, within households over time, and shopping characteristics, which vary between shopping trips. In addition to the usual statistics, mean and standard deviation, an additional statistic is provided for each variable: mean of within-household standard deviation across households. The purpose of this statistic is to capture the variation in explanatory variables for each household over time, which will be crucial if we hope to identify their impact on payment choice in the presence of household fixed effects.
Impact of Payment Choice on Transaction Value
To date, all papers aiming to determine the drivers of payment choice have treated transaction value as fully exogenous (for example, Klee, 2008; Ching & Hayashi, 2010; Arango et al., 2015; Wang & Wolman, 2014) . However, industry analysts observe numerous mechanisms where the causality goes the other way round, most notably the phenomenon of "ticket lift," which captures the fact that consumers paying by card tend to spend more than if they were paying cash (for example, see Layne-Farrar, 2011; Economists Incorporated, 2014) . This may be because consumers with credit cards are not constrained by the cash in their wallet, or because they feel less financially constrained when they do not directly see the money they are spending.
To see whether our data set provides any evidence of such causality, we put together a simple discontinuity analysis of spending patterns before and after a household acquires a payment card. The payment choice statistics for these households are presented in Table 3 . The averages captured in Table 3 shows that households observed in the data set saw their spending rise following the adoption of card. The rise -on average $5.59, or 16% -is substantial and suggests that ticket lift is a phenomenon that we need to account for in our analysis.
Instrumental Variables
We take the instrumental variable approach in order to address the potential problem of simultaneous causality between payment choice and transaction value illustrated in Table  3 . Thanks to the panel nature of our data set, we are able to directly observe a variable that can serve as an instrument: day of week.
The variable day of week satisfies both conditions required of instruments: it is informative, in that it has a direct impact on transaction value, and valid, in that it does not have a direct impact on the payment choice. Previous literature using scanner data has established that consumers exhibit clear shopping patterns throughout the week, with most households making smaller purchases on weekdays and larger shopping trips on Fridays and Saturdays (for example, Wang & Wolman, 2014) . This pattern is clearly visible in Figure  5 , which illustrates the average transaction value in our data set across days of the week. Given the evidence, we view day of week to have a strong, direct impact on transaction value. In order for day of week to be a valid instrument for transaction value it should not have a direct impact on payment choice. One such potential path is tied to the optimal inventory of cash, and suggests that individuals who are paid in cash are likely to have a higher cash inventory right after they receive their payment, increasing the probability they go shopping and pay with cash soon afterwards. If the pay day for this group of people is more likely to fall on a given day of the week, this may lead to day of week having a direct impact on payment choice. This link is explored in Klee (2008) and Wang & Wolman (2014) , who find that cash usage is lower on weekdays and higher on Fridays and Saturdays. However, those studies are based on aggregated data that does not allow the authors to directly observe consumers, and their findings are likely based more on the fact that cash-reliant consumers are more likely to go shopping after their pay day. In our study, by contrast, we analyze the payment choice conditional on the consumer making a shopping trip, and thus day of week is unlikely to influence payment choice through this channel. To further test the validity of our instrument we estimate the model using a restricted data sample, wherein we remove lower-income individuals who are more likely to be paid in cash. We report the results of this sensitivity analysis in the appendix.
Regression Analysis
The discussion below outlines our approach to modeling households' payment choice, as well as our econometric estimation strategy.
Modeling Approach
The model needs to capture all the factors we believe are important in short-term payment choice, as well as factors that affect long-term trends in the payments market. First, the model captures the impact of transaction value, which will be the focus of our analysis. Second, the model accounts for how observable demographic and shopping trip characteristics impact payment choice. Finally, the model captures unobserved household payment preferences that are allowed to differ over time, allowing us to capture their impact on long-term payment trends.
In order to model a household's payment choice, we employ a multinomial probit discrete choice model. The main unit of observation in our estimation is a shopping trip. A household h during shopping trip i chooses payment instrument m ∈ {cash, check, card} to maximize the following utility function:
Our analysis focuses on β x m ln(x i ), which captures the impact transaction value x i has on utility derived from payment choice m; we assume x i enters the utility function in logarithmic form. The term β s m s i is the utility derived from using payment instrument m during a shopping trip with characteristics s i . Two terms capture the utility derived by household h from using payment choice m: β d m d ht(i) captures the impact of observable demographic characteristics d ht(i) , while α hm captures the unobserved component of the preference. Finally, him is the error term distributed N (0, 1).
We observe payment choice M him = 1{W him ≥ W him , ∀m = m}, as well as explanatory variables x i , d ht(i) , and s i directly in the data set. Taking advantage of the panel nature of our data set we are able to capture the unobserved component α hm using household-fixed effects in our model. Importantly, using fixed effects does not prevent us from identifying the β d m coefficients, because the length of our panel allows us to capture substantial withinhousehold variation among those variables, as illustrated in Table 4 .
Estimation Strategy
The challenge in employing fixed effects in non-linear models such as ours is that it can result in biased coefficient estimates due to the incidental parameters problem (for example, see Baltagi, 2003) . Intuitively, this happens because an insufficient number of observations for each individual results in biased fixed effects estimates, which in turn contaminate the coefficient estimates on variables-of-interest due to the non-linear nature of the model. In our setting, while we observe a substantial number of shopping trips for the majority of households in our data set (Figure 1 ) we want to analyze payment choice also for the households with fewer shopping trips. In addition, while for most households we observe a good mix of cash and card payments, many households are likely to have only a few observations where the payment instrument is check (see Table 1 ).
We follow the recent literature that aims to correct for bias resulting from the presence of incidental parameters. We employ the bias-correcting jackknife estimation procedure described by Dhaene & Jochmans (2015) , which is related to the procedure proposed as a special case in Hahn & Newey (2004) . This approach estimates, and allows for the removal of, any potential bias by comparing parameters estimated based on the full sample with those estimated based on a specially constructed subsample of the data set. The jackknife procedure has two important advantages compared with procedures that take an analytic approach to bias correction (for example, Chamberlain, 1980; Hahn & Kuersteiner, 2011) . First, it does not require an explicit characterization of the incidental-parameter bias, which makes it relatively easy to implement. Second, it allows for the calculation of average marginal effects, which are of substantial interest to us. The jackknife procedure is described in full in the Appendix.
The richness of our data set, which contains more than 13,500 households and three payment instruments, makes the traditional procedures used to estimate discrete choice models computationally intractable. Instead, we estimate our model using an expectationmaximization (EM) algorithm. This approach, proposed by Chen (2014) , uses an iterative two-step procedure to greatly decrease the computational burden of estimating non-linear panel data models with unobserved heterogeneity. We provide an overview of this procedure in the Appendix.
In order to correct for potential endogeneity stemming from the impact of payment choice on transaction value we follow the control function approach, as outlined in Petrin & Train (2010) . The reason for this is that implementing a correction analogous to the two-stage least-squares in a discrete choice model would not correct for bias stemming from endogeneity. As the authors describe in their paper, the control function approach works well in a variety of non-linear models, including the multinomial probit model employed in our analysis.
Estimation Results
We estimate our payment choice model in multiple specifications. Specification (1) represents the basic regression, with the only explanatory variable being the logarithm of the transaction value: ln(x i ). Specification (2) adds additional explanatory variables: demographic characteristics d ht(i) and shopping trip characteristics s i . For demographic explanatory variables, we add male and female education levels, employment status of the male and female, male and female age, whether the house has a pet, race indicators, occupancy status, and household income. Each variable is entered as a set of dummy variables for categories used in the data set, as summarized in Table 1 . For shopping trip variables, we use the year, month, day of the month, shopper gender, whether the shopper had a frequent shopper card, number of coupons used, all entered as dummies, as well as store fixed effects. Specification (3) builds on specification (3) by adding household fixed effects, with the estimation procedure employing the Jackknife correction. Finally, specification (4) builds on this by adding instrumental variable correction for transaction value.
The analysis of the results is split into three parts. Section 5.1 discusses the impact of transaction value on payment choice, section 5.2 discusses the impact of other explanatory variables on payment choice, while section 5.3 discusses the household-specific preferences for payments. In addition, we provide robustness checks for our analysis in the Appendix.
Impact of Transaction Value on Payment Choice
Results in Table 5 capture the impact of transaction value on payment choice. First, we report the coefficients β x m on ln(x i ) for check and card, with the coefficient on cash normalized to zero. However, because our model is non-linear, a direct comparison of the coefficient values on ln(x i ) is insufficient to provide a full picture of how "responsive" payment choice is to changes in ln(x i ) because it does not account for the impact of other explanatory variables, including fixed effects, or the scaling effect resulting from the control function correction for endogeneity. Instead, we focus most of our attention on the marginal effect of a 1% increase in ln(x i ) on the probability of a payment instrument being chosen.
We begin by analyzing column (1). We find that the estimated coefficient on ln(x i ) is considerably higher for both check and card than for cash, and that it is slightly higher for check than for card. This result is a reflection of the trend illustrated in Figure 4 , namely that higher transaction values are associated with higher usage of card and check. Turning our attention to marginal effect estimates, we first observe that for all specifications there is a clear pattern between the three payment instruments: an increase in transaction value results in a fall in cash use and an increase in check and card use. We also find that for each specification, the absolute increase in card use is between two to three times larger than for check, reflecting the trend visible in Figure 4 .
Comparing results in column (2) with those in column (1), we find that adding explanatory variables increases model fit slightly, raising pseudo-R 2 value from 0.147 to 0.212, and reduces the estimated marginal effect of an increase in transaction value, especially for cash and card.
As expected, adding household fixed effects in specification (3) results in a substantially better fit of the model to the data, with pseudo-R 2 rising from 0.212 to 0.611. The enriched specification results in coefficient estimates on transaction value that have the same ordering as in columns (1) and (2), but with higher absolute values. However, comparing marginal effect estimates in column (3) with those in column (2) shows that accounting for unobserved household payment preferences decreases the estimate of how responsive payment choice is to transaction value. This effect is consistent with the anecdotal trend that households with higher average spending are more likely to be heavier check and card users. We thus find that not differentiating between such households and the lower-spending households that rely more on cash will result in an overestimation of the impact transaction value has on payment choice.
Turning our attention to specification (4), we find that correcting for endogeneity resulting from simultaneous causality between payment choice and transaction value results in a substantial decrease in the marginal effect estimates compared to specification (3). This is a big result that needs to be analyzed very carefully. To begin, it is important to note that the coefficients on transaction value remain significant, underscoring the intuitive mechanism that, everything else equal, consumers are more likely to pay with cash or check for higher-value purchases. At the same time, the substantial decrease in the magnitude of the marginal effect estimates confirms our expectation that payment choice impacts transaction value, suggesting that previous studies that did not correct for this simultaneous causality likely resulted in estimates of the impact of transaction value on payment choice that were biased upwards.
Other Determinants of Payment Choice
In order to analyze the impact of other observable variables on payment choice in a manageable way, we present coefficients on demographic characteristics in Table 6 , and coefficients on shopping trip characteristics in Table 7 . Table 6 presents the estimated coefficients β d m on demographic characteristics for check and card payment instruments, with the coefficient on cash normalized to zero. Since we find that the coefficients on demographic characteristics are not estimated very precisely in specification (3), due to limited variation of demographic characteristics over time, we instead present estimates from specification (2).
First, we find that single-head households have different payment preferences to twohead households: those without a male head are more likely to pay with check, while those without a female head are more likely to pay with either check or card. Income has a strong impact on payment choice, with higher-income households more likely to use card. The relationship between income and check usage, on the other hand, appears to be non-linear the likelihood of paying with check increases with income, then peaks for income group $35,000-$39,999, after which point it starts decreasing. Education also has a clear impact on payment choice, with the likelihood of using both check and card going up with the education level. The increase is greater for card, and for the woman's education level. The likelihood of paying by check increases and that of paying by card decreases in age for both the male and female head of the household, which is to be expected given that older people are less comfortable with carrying cash around and with electronic forms of payment. Race also has a clear impact on payment choice, with Black households being more likely to use cash, and Asian households being less likely to use check and more likely to use card, relative to White households. By contrast, employment does not have a clear impact on payment choice, although the results suggest full employment (35+ hours) by either the male or female head of household is associated with higher check use. Finally, we find that house ownership has a positive impact on the likelihood of check and card use, while pet ownership does not seem to have a clear impact on payment choice. Table 7 presents the estimated coefficients β s m on shopping trip characteristics for specification (3). First, we confirm that there is a clear time trend, with check becoming progressively less popular and card increasingly more popular as time goes on. The shopper's gender has a clear impact on payment choice, controlling on household composition, with female shoppers more likely to use check than male ones. Finally, shoppers who use frequent shopper rewards cards and coupons are more likely to pay with check and, in particular, card, suggesting these are more sophisticated shoppers who want to keep better track of their expenses and gain additional rewards while shopping.
Heterogeneity in Unobserved Household-Specific Payment Preferences
The three graphs in Figure 6 illustrates the impact on model fit of capturing unobserved household payment preferences. The first graph illustrates how the predicted distribution of cash payment share across households differs between model specifications (1) and (2), which do not employ fixed effects, and specifications (3) and (4), which do, and compares it to the true distribution, as previously illustrated in Figure 2 . The second and third graphs illustrate the distribution of check and card payment shares, respectively. The key take-away from Figure 6 is that employing household fixed effects allows our model to much more accurately fit the distribution of payment choices across households to those observed in our data. As we illustrate in the next section, the ability to capture the household-specific preferences has important implications on the ability of new payment instruments to enter the market.
Counterfactual
In an ideal world, we would be able to put together a counterfactual to analyze the impact of introducing a new payment instrument, and better understand the implications of household payment preferences on competition between payment instruments. Unfortunately, such a counterfactual would have to rely on speculation as to what the appeal of such a new instrument would be to the consumers, and how the appeal would vary across households. Instead, in our counterfactual we analyze the impact of removing one payment instrument, check, on the popularity of the remaining two instruments, cash and card. On one hand, one might expect most check users to start using card instead, because both are cashless instruments and, as Figure 4 shows, both are used to pay for high-value purchases. On the other hand, the results presented in Section 5 emphasize the importance of heterogeneous household payment preferences in explaining payment choices, suggesting that households will substitute away from check toward the payment instrument they have a higher idiosyncratic preference for. Moreover, Figure 3 shows that a large proportion of households focus the majority of their payments on one main instrument, suggesting that eliminating check will reinforce the split in the population among those households that favor cash, and those that favor card. Figure 7 illustrates how households would substitute away from making check payments by focusing on actual transactions paid with check, and then analyzing what proportion of these transactions would be paid with cash or card under the counterfactual scenario that payment by check is no longer possible. Looking at the first bar, we can see that eliminating check payments would result in a similar gain in the number of cash and card payments. This suggests that the substitution pattern is driven less by the functional similarities between check and card, such as their usefulness for making high-value purchases, and more by idiosyncratic household preferences for cash and card. This is further confirmed by looking at the subgroups of household who are heavy cash or heavy card users in both cases more than 80% of the transactions previously paid for by check would instead be paid for by the household's favorite payment instrument. This finding underlines the importance of household-specific preferences in driving payment choice.
Conclusion
We use an extensive scanner data set to cast fresh light on consumer payment choice. Relative to other studies of payment choice, our data set is large, long and very detailed. Taking advantage of the panel nature of our data set, we specify a fixed effect multinomial probit model that allows us to directly control for heterogeneous payment preferences between households. Our estimation utilizes a novel expectation-maximization computation algorithm, a jackknife algorithm to correct for potential bias due to the incidental parameter problem, and an instrumental variable approach to correct for the simultaneous causality between payment choice and transaction value. We find that accounting for heterogeneous tastes between households allows our model to fit the observed data much better, and decreases the estimated impact of transaction value on payment choice.
There are several key takeaways from our empirical study. First, we find that explicitly accounting for unobserved heterogeneity in household payment preferences greatly increases model fit, suggesting that panel data is particularly well-suited to payments research. Sec-ond, we find that the importance of transaction value as a driver of payment choice decreases significantly once we use instrumental variable correction for endogeneity in our model. This suggests that payment choices associated with higher transaction values, such as check and card, lead to more spending per shopping trip through phenomena such as "ticket lift", and that failing to account for such endogeneity can lead to positive bias in the importance of transaction value. Finally, our counterfactual analysis of what would happen if checks were no longer available suggests that, rather than switching to using card, the other instrument commonly used for high-value payments, they would switch to their preferred payment instrument. This finding underlines the fact that unobserved household preferences play a much larger role than transaction value in determining payment choice.
The importance of heterogeneous household payment preferences has important implications for the future of payments markets. When combined with substantial evidence of single-homing by consumers, this result suggests that new payment instruments may find it easier to enter the market if they focus on converting a smaller niche of consumers to use their product intensively, rather than targeting everyone but focusing on a narrow application. This may help explain why fobs have not successfully carved out a niche alongside plastic cards although all card-carrying consumers could benefit from using them, their speed advantage is evident only for small-value transactions when authentication is not required. In addition, our findings help explain how new internet-based payment instruments such as PayPal or Venmo have successfully gained a foothold in the payments market they offer a unique proposition to a narrower group of connected customers with a social media interest, which makes them preferable to other payment instruments.
Finally, this paper opens up many new avenues for future research. With a longer panel than the three years captured in our data set it would be possible to study the evolution of household payment preferences. One interesting question would be whether household preferences evolve over time, or are they set early on and then do not change, as would be suggested by anecdotal evidence of older consumers persisting with paying by check. Combined with data on merchant acceptability of different payment instruments such a long panel could provide a fascinating look at the process of instrument adoption in a twosided market. A data set which captured the exact card used to make a payment, of the potentially many owned by customers, would add an additional dimension to the study of single-homing, building on Rysman (2007) . This would be especially true if the data set contained purchases from other locations that just grocery stores, allowing for research into the extent to which customers use different cards for different purposes, potentially driven by targeted rewards on credit cards. Finally, a data set that captured not just the instrument but also the form the instrument took, such as plastic card, fob, or information stored on a smart phone, would allow for research into the role played by new developments in the payment market such as digital wallets. Notes: Coefficients on β x cash are normalized to zero and not reported above. Standard errors are in parenthesis. The number of observations is 1,341,226. Marginal effects on P (m = ·) calculated based on a 1% increase in ln(x i ), measured at sample means. Note: heavy cash/card users are defined as those that make at least 80% of their purchases with cash and card, respectively
